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INTRODUCTION

The most significant developments in Illinois real property law
during the Survey period involved legislation. The most important
legislative development was the enactment of the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987.1 The purpose of this act was to bring all
of the various entities engaged in residential mortgage lending
* Associate, Coffield Ungaretti Harris & Slavin, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., cum laude,
1982, Marquette University; J.D., cum laude, 1986, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1985, Kenyon College; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. See infra notes 101-53 and accompanying text.
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under appropriate regulatory control. 2 A second notable piece of
legislation is the Abandoned Housing Rehabilitation Act, which
provides charitable organizations with a method of taking possession of tax delinquent abandoned housing in order to rehabilitate it
for low- and middle-income housing.3
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed several different issues involving real property law during the Survey period.
The court assessed the validity of use restrictions in a case involving adult use zoning4 and a case involving a landowner's exclusion
of neighboring owners from waters overlying the lake bed of a private, non-navigable lake.5 In the area of taxation, the court evaluated the procedure of refunding a property tax overpayment by
offsetting the refund amount against additional taxes due on the
same piece of property. 6 Finally, the court determined the legal
significance of the term "heirs" in a deed clause that created an
alternative contingent remainder.7
II.

A.

USE RESTRICTIONS

Amortization of Non-Conforming Adult Uses
Under a Zoning Plan

In County of Cook v. RenaissanceArcade & Bookstore,' the owners of several adult uses9 challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the 1981 Ordinance Amending Certain Sections of the
Cook County Zoning Ordinance of 1976 ("1981 Ordinance").' 0
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order,
which enjoined the owners from continuing to operate in violation
of the ordinance. The supreme court held that the zoning plan and
its amortization requirements' did not violate the defendants'
right to distribute materials that are protected by the first
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 154-79 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 8-39 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
8. 122 Ill. 2d 123, 522 N.E.2d 73 (1988).
9. The 1981 Ordinance defines "adult uses" as "adult bookstores, adult entertainment
cabarets, adult mini motion picture theaters and adult motion picture theaters." Id. at
129, 522 N.E.2d at 75 (citing COOK COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 14.2 (1981)).
10. Id. The defendants challenged sections 13-10,. 13-17, 13.16-1, and 13.16-4-1 to
13.16-4-5. Id.
11. Amortization under a zoning ordinance means relocation of nonconforming, preexisting uses to sites permitted by the ordinance.
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amendment. 2
The plaintiff, Cook County, filed separate complaints seeking injunctions against several owners of non-conforming adult uses for
zoning violations.13 The plaintiff's zoning ordinance restricted
adult uses in unincorporated Cook County to seventy-eight specified industrially zoned areas 4 and 245 specified commercially
zoned areas. 5 Moreover, the ordinance required that the owner
obtain a special use permit from the County Board of Commissioners to operate an adult use in a commercially zoned area. Finally,
the ordinance prohibited operation of more than two adult uses
6
within 1000 feet of each other in a commercially zoned area.'
In addressing compliance with these requirements, the 1981 Ordinance contained an amortization provision that mandated the relocation of each non-conforming use to a conforming site within
six months after the county put the owner on notice. Owners
could apply for an automatic six-month extension or for a discretionary extension of one year or more.' 7 The Illinois Supreme
Court assessed the constitutionality of the 1981 Ordinance by applying the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters.'" The Renton Court recognized that restricting the geographical area in which adult uses can
operate furthers substantial government interests, such as preventing crime, protecting retail areas, and protecting property values. '9
However, a zoning ordinance may not be used to attempt to suppress the content of the materials distributed by adult uses. The
Renton standard therefore requires that an ordinance "refrain from
effectively denying ...a reasonable opportunity to open and oper20
ate an adult theater within the city."

The defendants relied on three federal cases which struck down
zoning ordinances that unconstitutionally restricted access to protected materials. 2'

The court found the ordinances that were

12. Renaissance, 122 111. 2d at 139-41, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
13. Id. at 128-29, 522 N.E.2d at 75.
14. The permitted industrial areas covered 10.8 square acres, which is 8.9% of the
available land in unincorporated Cook County. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 77.
15. Id. at 129-30, 522 N.E.2d at 75.
16. Id. at 130, 522 N.E.2d at 75.
17. Id.
18. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
19. Renaissance, 122 Ill. 2d at 133, 522 N.E.2d at 77.
20. Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 54).
21. See Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) and Purple
Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ordinances imposed additional restrictions that had the effect of excluding adult uses from 80% to 90% of the
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struck down to be factually distinguishable from the plaintiff's
1981 Ordinance. The court concluded that the invalidated ordinances cited by the defendants were significantly more restrictive
than the 1981 Ordinance, which allowed adult uses to locate freely
within seventy-eight specified industrial areas.22 The court held
that the 1981 Ordinance provided the defendants with a reasonable
opportunity to relocate and, therefore, did not interfere with the
23
defendants' first amendment rights.
The defendants also argued that the provisions of the Cook
County Zoning Ordinance of 197724 combined with the provisions
of the 1981 Ordinance to impose further restrictions on locating
within the areas specified by the 1981 Ordinance. 25 The defendants
contended that the unconstitutional provisions of the 1977 Ordinance, which were stricken in County of Cook v. World Wide News
Agency, 2 1 were severable from the remaining provisions of the ordinance, which continued to be effective. 27 The court rejected this
argument and stated that the county would not have adopted the
1977 Ordinance without the invalidated provisions. 2 The court
concluded that the County Zoning Board intended the 1981 Ordi29
nance to supersede the 1977 Ordinance completely.
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the absence of a "grandfather clause" 30 in the 1981 Ordinance rendered
the ordinance unconstitutional. 3' The court pointed out that pursuant to its prior decision in Village of Oak Park v. Gordon,32
amortization provisions are presumed to be valid.33 A party may
overcome this presumption only by showing that the governmental
interest furthered by the ordinance does not outweigh the economic hardship the ordinance would impose on the property
permitted areas); North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp.
1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (ordinance permitted adult uses in only two industrial areas).
22. Renaissance, 122 Ill. 2d at 137-38, 522 N.E.2d at 79.
23. Id. at 139-40, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
24. The 1977 Ordinance prohibited locating more than two adult uses within 1000
feet of each other or locating any adult use within 1000 feet of an area zoned for residential or church use. Id. at 145-46, 522 N.E.2d at 82.
25. Id. at 146, 522 N.E.2d at 83.
26. 98 111. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173 (1st Dist. 1981).
27. Renaissance, 122 I11.
2d at 146, 522 N.E.2d at 82.
28. Id. at 148, 522 N.E.2d at 83-84.
29. Id. at 148-49, 522 N.E.2d at 84.
30. A "grandfather clause" is a provision that would allow existing businesses to continue to operate at their present locations by exempting them from the restrictions of the
new zoning ordinance. Id. at 140, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
31. Id. at 141, 522 N.E.2d at 80.
32. 32 Ill. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965).
33. Renaissance, 122 Ill. 2d at 143, 522 N.E.2d at 81.
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owner. 34 The defendants in Renaissance failed to present any evidence that relocation would cause economic hardship. 35 The
County, on the other hand, presented evidence of the harmful effects of concentrated adult uses on surrounding residential and
commercial areas. 36 Consequently, the court concluded that the
defendants failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the
amortization provision.37
The defendants did prevail on one argument. The court agreed
with the defendants that the 1981 Ordinance unconstitutionally
vested the County Board of Commissioners with impermissible discretion to grant or deny special use permits in commercially zoned
areas. 38 Nevertheless, the court held that this provision was severable from the rest of the ordinance, which could stand on its own
without violating the defendants' constitutional rights.39
In the end, the defendants' only victory in Renaissance led to
broader restrictions on where the defendants could locate their
businesses. If the defendants had not challenged the 1981 Ordinance, they would at least have had some opportunity to operate in
a commercially zoned area. The court's holding that the provision
for special use permits was severable, however, left the defendants
with no opportunity to locate within commercially zoned areas.
Adult uses in unincorporated Cook County are now restricted to
the seventy-eight industrial areas specified in the 1981 Ordinance.
Clearly, such areas generally are not considered desirable locations
for movie theaters or bookstores. However, the court has correctly
emphasized the ill effects of these establishments on their surrounding areas.
Land Use Restrictions on Overlying Waters of a Private,
Non-Navigable Lake
Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property Owners Association'
presented a question of first impression for the Illinois Supreme
Court. The court considered whether a lake bed owner has the
B.

34. Id.
35. Factors that could have been considered are purchase price, cost of improvements
and relocation, depreciation, and lost income. Id. at 143-44, 522 N.E.2d at 81-82.
36. Id. at 144, 522 N.E.2d at 82.
37. Id. at 144-45, 522 N.E.2d at 82.
38. Id. at 151-52, 522 N.E.2d at 85. The court concluded that the ordinance lacked
sufficiently narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide county officials in granting
or denying special use permits. Id.
39. Id. at 152, 522 N.E.2d at 85. The court concluded that the 78 industrially zoned
areas provided the defendants with a sufficient alternative avenue of communication. Id.
40. 123 Ill. 2d 227, 526 N.E.2d 154 (1988).
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right to exclude neighboring owners from his overlying waters.4
The Beacham court held that the owner of a portion of a private,
non-navigable lake bed is entitled to reasonable use of the entire
lake, so long as that use does not interfere with the reasonable use
of the waters by other owners and their licensees.42
The plaintiff, Beacham, was the owner of approximately fifteen
to twenty percent of the lake bed of Lake Zurich, a private, nonnavigable lake.43 The plaintiff operated a public boat rental business at the lake. The defendant controlled a majority of the lake
bed and attempted to exclude others from its overlying waters by
issuing warnings to violators, including the plaintiff and her licensees. The defendant also brought trespass actions against persons
who were repeatedly warned." The plaintiff sought injunctive relief and a declaration that, as owner of a part of the lake, she and
her licensees were entitled to reasonable use of the whole lake.45
The court noted that other jurisdictions were divided over the
respective rights of lake bed owners. The common law view endorsed an owner's right to exclude others from the waters above
the owner's portion of the lake bed.6 The civil law view provided
that partial lake bed owners had the right to enjoy the use of the
whole lake surface as long as their use did not unduly interfere
with the use of the lake by other lake bed owners.47 The Beacham
court adopted the civil law rule because it promoted mutual enjoyment of a shared resource and because of the myriad of practical
41. Id. at 229-30, 526 N.E.2d at 156.
42. Id. at 230, 526 N.E.2d at 157. The court pointed out that the Illinois Supreme
Court's holding in Leonard v. Pearce, 348 Ill. 518, 181 N.E. 399 (1932), was not dispositive, as the defendants contended. The Leonard court merely held that Lake Zurich was
non-navigable and that lake bed owners had a right to exclude members of the general
public. The court distinguished the present case, which dealt with a dispute among lake
bed owners, from the dispute in Leonard between the lake bed owners and the public.
Beacham, 123 Il. 2d at 230, 526 N.E.2d at 157.
43. Beacham, 123 Ill. 2d at 228, 526 N.E.2d at 155-56.
44. Id. at 228, 526 N.E.2d at 155.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 230, 526 N.E.2d at 157. The common law view applied the traditional
property law concept that ownership includes everything above and below the land surface. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 156 (citing Medlock v. Galbreath, 208 Ark. 681, 187
S.W.2d 545 (1945); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, 253 Ga. 549, 322 S.E.2d 494
(1984); Sanders v. De Rose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934); Baker v. Normanoch
Ass'n, 25 N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957); Commonwealth Water Co. v. Brunner, 175
A.D. 153, 161 N.Y.S. 794 (1916); Smoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 A. 144 (1904);
Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Wickouski v.
Swift, 203 Va. 467, 124 S.E.2d 892 (1962)).
47. Id. at 230, 526 N.E.2d at 157 (citing Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla.
1959); Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960); Snively v. Jaber, 48
Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956)).
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problems associated with the common law rule.48
The view adopted by the Beacham court is the more practical
and workable of the two alternatives. This civil law view sensibly
creates an exception to the general rule that one of the incidents of
ownership is the right to exclude others, given the particular situation involved. 49 The court correctly pointed to the difficulties in
settling border disputes that would accompany the common law
rule. The standard of reasonableness underlying the civil law rule
gives the court a great deal of latitude to fashion solutions to the
problems that do arise. For example, the Beacham court seemed
troubled by the plaintiff's rental of boats to the general public. On
remand, the supreme court instructed the trial court to determine
whether this practice interfered with the other property owners'
reasonable use of the waters of this private lake. 5"
III.

PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES

In Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board,5"
a taxpayer, Marriott Corporation ("Marriott"), challenged the
Lake County Tax Collector's (the "Collector") use of an offset to
refund an overpayment of property taxes.52 Marriott asserted that
the procedure constituted an unlawful deviation from the Collector's statutorily-defined refund and collection procedures.53 The
Lake County Board of Review argued that the Collector had the
discretion to use an offset procedure. The court rejected Marriott's
challenge, holding that a tax collector may use an offset to refund
money owed to a taxpayer and contemporaneously to collect
money owed by that taxpayer on the same piece of property.54
The Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (the "Appeal Board")
ordered a reduction of the 1981 real estate tax assessment of Marriott's Great America Theme Park.55 The circuit court subsequently
48. Id. at 232, 526 N.E.2d at 157. The problems include determining where property
lines fall on the surface water and enforcing exclusive possession. In addition, the court
indicated that adopting the common law view would lead lake bed owners to erect barriers across the surface waters. Id.
49. The appellate court noted that these cases invariably involve an owner of a majority of the lake bed who is attempting to restrict the other owners to the small portions of
the lake overlying their own property. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property Owners Ass'n,
159 Ill. App. 3d 204, 206, 511 N.E.2d 226, 227 (2d Dist. 1987).
50. Beacham, 123 I11.2d at 232, 526 N.E.2d at 157.
51. 119 I11.2d 419, 519 N.E.2d 459 (1988).
52. Id. at 422-23, 519 N.E.2d at 461. Marriott was allowed to appeal pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315. Id. at 422, 519 N.E.2d at 461.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 431, 519 N.E.2d at 465.
55. Id. at 421, 519 N.E.2d at 460.
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reversed the reduction, but the reduction was reinstated on appeal. 6 On remand, the circuit court granted Marriott's motion for
an entry of judgment ordering a refund of the tax overpayment.5"
The Collector asserted that this order was complied with by offsetting the amount owed to Marriott against additional taxes that
Marriott owed following an increase in the assessed value of the
property for 1982 and 1983.58 Marriott sought to enforce the refund order, maintaining that the offset was not in compliance. 59
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether the offset
constituted a "refund" in compliance with the statute. 60 The court
determined that, in the absence of a statutory definition, "refund"
must be taken in its "ordinary and popularly understood meaning," 61 which encompassed an offset.62 The court stated that, despite the lack of an obligation on either party to submit their
payment immediately at the time of the offset, both parties' obligations had been finally determined and, therefore, had accrued at
the time of the offset.63
The court next examined whether the Illinois Legislature provided sufficient standards to control the collection activities at issue
and whether the Collector exceeded the bounds of those standards.
The court found that the designation of county treasurers as collectors and the specification of a collector's duties constituted a lawful
delegation of authority to an administrative agency. 64 This express
grant included a grant of power to do what was reasonably necessary to execute those duties. 65 The court held that the offset procedure was a reasonable means for accomplishing the statutory
directives for collection of property taxes.6 6
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the offset procedure violated Marriott's right to due process of law. The court
found that the offset did not deprive Marriott of a meaningful opportunity to contest the tax rate applicable to the 1982-83 reassess56. Id. at 421-22, 519 N.E.2d at 460.
57. Id. at 422, 519 N.E.2d at 461.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 423-25, 519 N.E.2d at 461-62.
61. Id. at 423, 519 N.E.2d at 461.
62. Id. at 425, 519 N.E.2d at 462. The court decided to give the term "refund" a
broad reading even though it acknowledged that it is most commonly used to mean the
issuance of cash or a cash equivalent. Id. at 424, 519 N.E.2d at 461.
63. Id. at 425, 519 N.E.2d at 462.
64. Id. at 427, 519 N.E.2d at 463.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 428, 519 N.E.2d at 463.
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ment. 67 The court reasoned that any basis for contesting the tax
rate as applied to the increased assessment was equally valid to
contest the tax rate applied to the original assessments in 1982 and
1983.68 Marriott had the opportunity to file rate objections to the
original 1982 and 1983 assessments. 69 The court concluded, therefore, that Marriott did not have a right to challenge the rate a second time.7"
The court determined that a refund of a property tax overpayment may be issued by offsetting that amount against additional
taxes owed by the taxpayer. However, this procedure apparently
will be limited to obligations on the part of the taxpayer that have
already accrued.7" The offset procedure may also be limited to situations in which the refund and the tax liability correspond to the
same piece of property.
IV.

TRANSFERS OF AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY

In Warren-Boynton State Bank v. Wallbaum, 72 the Illinois
Supreme Court construed a 1903 deed. The Wallbaum court addressed the primary issue of whether the grantor intended the
designation of his "heirs" as alternative contingent remaindermen 73 to be determined at his death or at some other time. 74 Reso-

lution of this issue hinged on the interpretation of the term "heirs"
in the deed.75 Applying the standard of the preponderance of the
67. Id. at 429-30, 519 N.E.2d at 464.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 429, 519 N.E.2d at 464.
70. Id. at 430, 519 N.E.2d at 464. The court pointed out that no evidence indicated
that the increased assessment was large enough to increase markedly Marriott's incentive
to contest the tax rate. The court noted the impracticability of allowing tax rate protests
every time an assessment occurred after the year's tax rate had been determined. Id.
71. Id. at 425, 519 N.E.2d at 462. The court commented that an offset against an
unaccrued obligation arguably could be regarded as a credit, not a refund. Id.
72. 123 Ill. 2d 429, 528 N.E.2d 640 (1988).
73. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
74. Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d at 431-32, 528 N.E.2d at 642. The court briefly addressed
the questions of whether the doctrine of worthier title or the rule in Shelly's case applied
to this deed. Id. at 442, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
75. The relevant language of the deed was:
The Grantor, William Wallbaum .

. . ,

conveys and warrants to Emma May

Wallbaum ... [a] life estate in the following described real estate .... The said
William Wallbaum hereby reserves a life estate in the above described land towit: He shall have the right to the use and occupancy of said land and to all the
rents, issues and profits thereof during his natural life. And upon the death to
said Emma May Wallbaum leaving children of her body her surviving, the
above described real estate shall descend to such children share and share alike.
The children of any deceased child, taking only the share which their parent
would inherit if living. Upon the death of said Emma May Wallbaum leaving

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

evidence, the court held that the grantor used the term "heirs" in
the alternative contingent remainder in a non-technical sense to
mean heirs determined at some time other than at the grantor's
death.76
By the 1903 deed, the grantor, William Wallbaum, ("William")
reserved a life estate for himself and conveyed a life estate to his
daughter, Emma Wallbaum ("Emma"). The grantor created a
contingent remainder in the children of Emma and an alternative
contingent remainder in the "heirs" of William." William died in
1905.78 He was survived by Emma and his three sons. Emma died
childless in 1984. William's three sons died before Emma. Two of
the sons had children living at the time of Emma's death.7 9
The plaintiffs, Warren-Boynton State Bank, the executor of
Emma's estate, and a beneficiary under Emma's will, instituted an
action for partition. The defendants were descendants of William's
three sons.8 0 The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, finding that William used the term "heirs" in
its technical sense, which required the class of heirs to be determined at the time of William's death." The court refused to imply
a condition that required the grantor's heirs at the time of the
grantor's death to survive the life tenant, Emma. 2 As a result, a
one-fourth interest passed to the heirs of each of William's four
children.83

The appellate court reversed the decision of the circuit court.8 4
The appellate court held that William used "heirs" in the clause
that created the alternative contingent remainder to mean "children."8s5 The court found an implied condition that these children

survive the life tenant to take as remaindermen.8 6 As the life tenant, Emma could not pass any interest through her will. Because
no such children her surviving the above described real estate shall descend to
the heirs of said William Wallbaum share and share alike. The children of any
deceased child taking only the share which their parent would inherit if living.
Id. at 432-33, 528 N.E.2d at 642.
76. Id. at 432-33, 528 N.E.2d at 642.
77. Id. at 434, 528 N.E.2d at 643.
78. Id. at 433, 528 N.E.2d at 642.
79. Id. at 434, 528 N.E.2d at 643.
80. Id. at 432, 528 N.E.2d at 642.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 434-35, 528 N.E.2d at 643.
84. Warren Boynton State Bank v. Wallbaum, 143 Ill. App. 3d 628, 635, 493 N.E.2d
21, 27 (4th Dist. 1986).
85. Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d at 435, 528 N.E.2d at 643.
86. Id.
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none of William's son's survived Emma, the life tenant, each son's
remainder interest was extinguished at his respective death.87 The
court concluded, however, that the language of the deed created a
gift over to William's grandchildren which vested at the time of
their respective parent's death. 8 Under this distribution scheme, a
one-third interest passed to the heirs of each of William's three
sons.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected both of the lower courts'
analyses. The court indicated that it had not previously adopted as
a matter of law the technical interpretation of the term "heirs." 8 9
The court instead sought to give effect to the transferor's intent.
To determine the transferor's intent, the court looked to the deed
itself and to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
deed. 90
The supreme court agreed with the appellate court that William
used the term "heirs" in a non-technical sense. However, the
supreme court rejected the determination that William used
"heirs" to mean "children." The court pointed out that in the
deed itself, William used "children" in the clause that created the
contingent remainder, but "heirs" in the clause that created the
alternative contingent remainder. The use of both terms suggested
to the court that William used the term "children" to mean children and the term "heirs" to mean something else. 91
The court found further support for this construction in the circumstances surrounding the deed. Two years after drafting this
deed, William executed a new will. 92 The court compared the language of a provision of this will to the language of the 1903 deed.
This provision directed the executor to set up a life estate and designated both contingent remaindermen and alternative contingent
remaindermen. 93 The court noted once more that William used
87. Id.
88. Id. at 436, 528 N.E.2d at 643.
89. Id. at 437, 528 N.E.2d at 644. The court pointed out that since the recent decision in Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Beach, 118 Ill. 2d 1, 513 N.E.2d 833 (1987), the
burden of proof in such a case is by a preponderance of the evidence, not the former
standard of "clear evidence." Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d at 437, 528 N.E.2d at 644.
90. Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d at 436, 528 N.E.2d at 644.
91. Id. at 438, 528 N.E.2d at 645.
92. Id. at 439, 528 N.E.2d at 645. In the interim, William's wife had given birth to
his fourth child, a son. The will instructed one of his other sons to transfer a life interest
in a piece of property to the youngest son. Id.
93. Id. at 439-40, 528 N.E.2d at 645. The life estate was to be conveyed to William
Conway Wallbaum, the grantor's youngest son, and the remainder interest was as
follows:
And upon the death of the said William Conway Wallbaum leaving children of

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

the term children when he meant children.94 The court concluded
that to interpret "heirs" as "children" would defeat the grantor's
intent. 95
When the deed was drafted, William had three children: Emma,
who was five years old, and two adult sons. William's grandchildren were approximately the same age as Emma. The court noted
that William must have been aware of the likelihood that neither
he nor his sons would outlive Emma.96 The court also suggested
that William must have contemplated the possibility that even his
grandchildren might not be alive at the expiration of Emma's life
tenancy.97 The court concluded that a reasonable interpretation of
William's intent indicated that the alternative contingent remainder, if used, would transfer the property to William's descendants
who were living at the time of Emma's death.9"
Thus, the court construed the term "heirs" to mean the heirs of
William Wallbaum as determined at the time of Emma's death. 99
At Emma's death, only two of William's sons had descendants living. The court therefore ordered that the descendants of each of
these sons share a one-half interest in the property."°
In interpreting this deed, the court engaged in a great deal of
speculation. There is no indication that William himself drafted
the 1903 deed or the 1905 will. The emphasis the court placed on
the use of "heirs" in the clause that created the alternative contingent remainder in the deed, as opposed to the use of "children" in
a similar provision of the will, therefore, seems misplaced. However, the deed itself does contain indications that the distribution
scheme that the court arrived at is what William intended. By conveying only a life estate to Emma and providing that if she died
childless the remainder would vest in his heirs, William demonstrated an intent that this property remain in the family.
his body surviving him, the above described real estate shall descend to such
children, share and share alike. The children of any deceased child taking only
the share which their parent would inherit if living. Upon the death of William
Conway Wallbaum leaving no such children surviving, the above described real
estate shall descend to my surviving children share and share alike. The children of any deceased child taking only the part that their parent would inherit if
living.
Id. (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 440, 528 N.E.2d at 645.
95. Id. at 441, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
96. Id. at 439, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 440, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
99. Id. at 441, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
100. Id. at 442, 528 N.E.2d at 647.
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A.

LEGISLATION

The Residential Mortgage License Act

The Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987 ("License
Act")1 0 1 gives the Commissioner of Savings and Loan Associations
(the "Commissioner") the power to investigate and regulate the
brokering, funding, originating, servicing, and purchasing of residential mortgage loans. The legislature's primary concern was
protection of consumers from unscrupulous lenders, particularly in
0 2
the area of mortgage refinancing.
1. Purpose and Scope of the License Act
The legislature pointed to several significant recent changes in
the mortgage lending industry that gave rise to the need for the
License Act. Interest rate volatility, the sophistication of the national secondary market for mortgage loans, and the market for
mortgage-backed securities have altered the nature of the industry. 0 3 In addition, the trend toward deregulation of financial services industries has dramatically increased the types of mortgages
offered, the manner in which mortgages are offered to the public,
and the entities involved in mortgage lending."° As a result of the
changes, many of these mortgage lending entities were not operating under appropriate regulatory supervision. The License Act applies to all persons or business entities that broker, originate, or
service residential mortgage loans, with the exception of those entities specifically exempted.' 5
Because the License Act was designed to fill a regulatory void,
the legislature exempted many mortgage lenders. Most importantly, the License Act exempts lenders in the banking and insurance industries.' ° 6 Presumably, the legislature believed that these
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 2321-1 to 2325-1 (1987). The License Act succeeds "An Act to provide for the regulation of mortgage bankers," ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
17, paras. 2301-2314 (1985). The License Act became effective on January 1, 1988. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2321-3(h) (1987).
102. SENATE DEBATES, 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., at 183 (June 29, 1987).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2321-2(a) (1987).
104. Id.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2321-3 (1987).
106. The following entities are exempt:
(i) Any banking organization or foreign banking corporation licensed by the
Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies or the United States
Comptroller of the Currency to transact business in [Illinois]; (ii) any national
bank, federally chartered savings and loan association, federal credit union; (iii)
any pension trust, bank trust or bank trust company; (iv) any savings and loan
association or credit union organized under the laws of [Illinois] or any other
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lenders already operated under appropriate regulatory supervision.
The License Act also exempts persons who merely forward applications and credit and appraisal information to mortgage lenders.10 7 An employee of a mortgage lender need not be licensed
himself as long as he works for only one mortgage lender. °s
Again, the activities of such employees will be regulated either by
the License Act or by the regulations governing exempt lenders.
The legislature also exempted persons who make and acquire
mortgage loans with their own funds without the intent to resell
more than ten loans in one year."°9 Finally, an exemption was created for entities that originate, broker, or service loans but receive
no compensation for these activities.I 10
2.

Licensing Procedure

To obtain a license, the mortgage lender must file a written application. 1 1 The truth of the statements contained in the application must be verified under oath. 1 2 The applicant must also file a
list of judgments entered against him and bankruptcy proceedings
by him in the ten years preceding the application. 3 The application must attest to the financial solvency of the applicant. 4 The
application'must disclose the names and addresses of all partners,
directors, and principal officers, along with information about their
state; (v) any Illinois "Consumer Installment Loan Act" licensee; (vi) any insurance company authorized to transact business in [Illinois]; (vii) any entity
engaged solely in commercial mortgage lending; (viii) any service corporation
of a savings and loan association organized under the laws of [Illinois] or the
service corporation of a federally chartered savings and loan association having
its principal place of business in [Illinois], other than a service corporation licensed or entitled to reciprocity under the Real Estate License Act of 1983, as
amended; or (ix) any subsidiary or affiliate of a bank, the charter of which is
issued pursuant to the Illinois Banking Act by the Illinois Commissioner of
Banks and Trust Companies, or the subsidiary or affiliate of a bank chartered by
the United States Comptroller of the Currency and which has its principal place
of business in [Illinois], or any subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign banking corporation, the certificate of authority of which is issued pursuant to the Foreign
Banking Office Act by the Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2321-4(d)(1) (1987).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2321-4(d)(4) (1987). These persons must be licensed under the Real Estate License Act of 1983. Id.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
Id.
ILL.
ILL.

REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.

17,
17,
17,
17,

para.
para.
para.
para.

2321-4(d)(3) (1987).
2321-4(d)(2) (1987).
2322-4(d)(5) (1987).
2322-3 (1987).

REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-2(a)(2) (1987).
REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-3(a)(1) (1987).
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character, integrity, and financial responsibility." 5
The applicant is required to attach a list of twenty-two averments to the application. Seven of these consist of promises to
comply with specific provisions or general principles of the License
Act." 6 Six averments involve promises not to engage in fraudulent
or dishonest mortgage lending practices." 7 Five averments affirm
that the applicant has not done anything to lead the Commissioner
to deny him a license."I The last three averments promise to keep
adequate records, notify the Commissioner of changes in information on the application, and notify the commissioner of any judgments against the licensee or bankruptcy proceedings.' 9
A license granted under this act must be renewed every year. 120
The renewal application must be submitted at least sixty days
before the expiration of the license.' 2 ' The Commissioner may refuse to renew the license of any licensee who is not in compliance
with the provisions of the Licence Act. 122 An application that is
not renewed is considered inactive and will expire automatically
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-3(a)(3) (1987). This includes disclosure of
the identity and integrity of owners of more than 10% of the stock of the license applicant corporation. Id.
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4 (a) (1987) (maintain a full service office in
Illinois); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(b) (1987) (maintain adequate staff); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(d) (1987) (file required reports); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17,
para. 2322-4(e) (1987) (refrain from rejecting applications or varying the terms of a mortgage without reasonable cause for mortgages secured by residences within specific geographical areas); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(i) (1987) (refrain from redlining);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(t) (1987) (comply with provisions of act and rules
issued pursuant to it); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(u) (1987) (submit to periodic
examination of books and records).
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(f) (1987) (fraudulent underwriting practices); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(g) (1987) (monetarily influencing real estate
appraisers); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-40) (1987) (false promises and advertisements); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(k) (1987) (material misrepresentations);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(1) (1987) (refusal to disburse funds as agreed); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(n) (1987) (unlawful withholding of funds).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(h) (1987) (has filed tax returns for past
three years); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(o) (1987) (no past conduct which
would be grounds for denial of license); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(p) (1987)
(has not become insolvent); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(q) (1987) (no material
misstatements in application); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-4(r) (1987) (no past
incompetency or negligence in mortgage lending).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 2322-4(c), 2322-4(s), 2322-4(v) (1987).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-3 (1987).
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-6(a) (1987). The License Act gives the Commissioner the ability to levy a fine of $100 per month for a late application provided that
the Commissioner has evidence that the licensee continues to engage in activities governed by the act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-6(b)(1)(2) (1987).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2322-5 (1987).
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after it has been inactive for one year. 123
3. Operations
The License Act contains several provisions designed to ensure
that licensees operate their businesses honestly and fairly. At least
once each year, the licensee must have a certified public accountant
audit his books and records.' 24 This audit requirement seeks to
ensure that the financial statements the licensee submits to the
Commissioner accurately reflect the licensee's financial status. 125
In addition, the License Act explicitly prohibits licensees from distributing deceptive or misleading advertisements. 126 Specifically,
licensees may not use advertisements that state or imply that their
rates are recommended or approved by the state. 127 All advertisements must contain the words "Illinois Residential Mortgage Licensee.' 128 If a licensee operates solely as a broker, his
advertisements must disclose the limited scope of the licensee's operation. 129 Finally, the License Act contains an anti-discrimination
provision. Licensees are prohibited from refusing to grant a loan
or altering the terms of a loan on the basis of discrimination
against the loan applicant 130 or against the neighborhood of the
proposed security. 131
The License Act also contains provisions designed to ensure the
continued solvency of the licensees. By January 1, 1989, all licensees under the act are required to maintain a net worth of not less
than $100,000.132 In addition, the licensee must retain a reliable
mortgage funding program of $250,000.13 Any person to whom a
licensee delegates responsibility for control over or access to funds
must be bonded to protect the licensee from losses due to that per123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 2322-6(c), 2322-6(d) (1987).
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-2(a) (1987).
125. Id.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-3(a) (1987). The Commissioner may issue a
cease and desist order to licensees who violate this provision. Id.
127. Id.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-3(c) (1987).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-3(d) (1987).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-8(a)(i) (1987). A loan applicant may not be
turned down on the basis of race, religion, national origin, age, gender, or marital status.
Id.
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-8(a)(ii) (1987). The procedure of refusing to
grant mortgages that are to be secured by residential housing in certain geographical
areas is a form of discrimination known as "redlining." Id.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-5 (1987).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-6 (1987). The Commissioner may reduce
this amount if the licensee restricts his activities to brokering. Id.
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son's dishonest or criminal acts. 34
Other provisions of the License Act ensure that the mortgagor
always has access to information about his loan. The licensee must
notify the mortgagor of the transfer of servicing on his loan.'35
This notice must be given at the time of the transfer. The notice
must tell the mortgagor where his next three payments should be
sent, the amount of those payments, and where the mortgagor can
address his questions. 36 In addition, every licensee is required to
maintain and to staff adequately a full service office in Illinois. 137
4.

Supervision

In addition to the yearly audits to which a licensee must submit,
every twenty-four months the licensee must undergo a complete
1 38
examination of its records by the Commissioner's appointee.
The examiner may require testimony under oath of the licensee's
officers and employees.' 39 If the examination uncovers evidence of
unlawful activity by an affiliate of the licensee, the affiliate also may
be subject to an examination."4 The licensee is responsible for the
costs of the examination.14 ' Finally, only the Commissioner and
the licensee will have access to the report of the examination issued
by the examiner.'42
The License Act gives the Commissioner the power to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses at any hearing or to
compel the production of documents.143 The Commissioner may
petition the court for an order to comply with the subpoena."
The court then may issue an injunction to prevent the licensee
from continuing to engage in activities governed by the License
Act.'45 Where compliance with the .subpoena is essential, the
Commissioner may petition the court to have a bond conditioned
upon compliance. 146 In addition, either the Commissioner or his
134.
payable
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-1 (1987). This is an indemnity bond that is
to the licensee in the event of a loss due to the conduct described above. Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-7 (1987).
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2323-4 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-2 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-2(a) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-2(c) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-2(d) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-2(e) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-3(a) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-3(b) (1987).
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-3(c) (1987).
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representative may administer oaths. 47
The License Act specifies the grounds for which the Commissioner may suspend or revoke any license. If the Commissioner
determines that a licensee has violated a provision of this act or the
rules of the Commissioner, or has violated a law, rule, or regulation of Illinois or the United States, that license may be suspended
or revoked. 4 The Commissioner also may suspend or revoke a
license if a fact or condition exists that would have led the Commissioner to refuse to issue a license if that fact or condition had
existed at the time of the application.' 4 9 A license may be suspended or revoked, however, only after the licensee has been given
notice and provided with a hearing.' 0 Following a hearing, a copy
of the Commissioner's order of suspension will be published in a
newspaper in the county in which the licensee is located.' 5 '
The License Act gives the Commissioner very broad discretion
over enforcement of the act's provisions. This discretion is necessary to achieve the broad policy of ensuring fairness and honesty in
mortgage lending. The Commissioner has several alternatives to
revoking or suspending a license. The Commissioner may put the
licensee on probation or reprimand the licensee.' 52 On the other
hand, the Commissioner has the power to levy fines of up to
$10,000 for each separate offense. 53 In the end, the effectiveness of
the License Act will depend on the manner in which the Commissioner enforces the act.
147.
148.

149.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-3(a) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(a)(1) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(a)(2) (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(c) (1987). However,

150.
the Commissioner
may initiate a suspension or revocation without notice upon a showing of good cause that
an emergency exists. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(b) (1987).
151, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(2) (1987).
152.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 2324-5(h)(3), 2324-5(h)(4) (1987).

153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(h)(5) (1987). The grounds for imposing
fines are: the conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude; fraud or misrepresentation in mortgage lending; a material or intentional misstatement of fact on an application;
failure to follow the Commissioner's rules regarding the placement of funds in escrow;
insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings; failure to deliver money that the licensee has no
right to retain; failure to disburse funds in accordance with agreements; misuse of trust or
escrow funds; revocation of a professional license due to fraud or dishonest dealings;
failure to issue a satisfaction of mortgage loan when required; failure to comply with any
order of the Commissioner; engaging in any activity regulated by the License Act without
a license; failure to pay fees and fines on time; improper bookkeeping; refusal to permit
an investigation provided for by the License Act; operating with a pattern of substantially
underestimating closing costs; and non-compliance or violation of the License Act. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2324-5(i) (1987).
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B.

The Abandoned Housing RehabilitationAct

1 54
The Abandoned Housing Rehabilitation Act ("Housing Act")
is designed to encourage the restoration of abandoned, tax delinquent residential buildings for use as middle- and low-income
rental housing. The Housing Act has two very important benefits.
First, the act provides non-profit organizations with the means to
obtain temporary possession of and, eventually, legal title to these
properties. 5 Second, once an organization has petitioned the
court for temporary possession, the owner must rehabilitate the
property to avoid losing the property.156 Each aspect results in the
property being returned to the housing market.

1. Conditions Precedent
The Housing Act applies to property that is a nuisance, 5 7 has
been tax delinquent for the preceding two years, 58 and has been
unoccupied for the preceding year.159 The Housing Act defines a
nuisance as a building that is a public nuisance because of its physical condition or use, that constitutes a blight upon the surrounding
area, or that is unfit for human habitation under applicable fire,
building, and housing codes." 6
An organization may petition for temporary possession of a
qualifying property if the organization intends to rehabilitate the
property for low- and middle-income housing.' 6 ' To receive ap62
proval, the organization must operate on a not-for-profit basis.'
The Housing Act requires the petitioning organization to notify all
organization's inparties in interest regarding the property of the163
Act.
Housing
the
under
possession
tent to take
154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, paras. 851-859 (1987). The Housing Act became
effective on January 1, 1988. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 851 (1987).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, paras. 853, 859 (1987).
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 854 (1987).
157. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 853(b) (1987).
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 853(a) (1987).
159. Id. Occupation by persons not legally in possession of the property will not
defeat this condition. Id.
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 852(b) (1987).
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 853(c) (1987).
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 852(c) (1987).
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 853(d) (1987). The Housing Act defines parties in interest as owners of record, judgment creditors, tax purchasers, and other parties
who have any legal or equitable title or interest in the property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67
1/2, para. 852(a) (1987).
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Petition Proceedings

The owner may file a plan for rehabilitation of the property as an
answer or an affirmative defense to a petition for temporary possession. 164 The owner then will be given ninety days to bring the
1 65
property into compliance with building, fire, and housing codes.1 66
This period may be extended upon a showing of good cause.
Moreover, if the owner brings the property within compliance, the
petition will be dismissed.1 6 ' However, if the owner fails to bring
the property within compliance, then his affirmative defense will be
stricken and a hearing will be held to evaluate the merits of the
petitioner's rehabilitation plan.1 68 At this hearing, the organization
must submit its plan and present evidence of adequate resources to
complete and manage the project. 169
3.

Temporary Possession

Upon approval of the petition, the court will enter an order
granting temporary possession to the organization.1 70 This order
will allow the organization to enter into leases and other agree71
ments in relation to the property, subject to court approval.

If

the property is sold for unpaid taxes, the organization with temporary possession may redeem the property in the same manner as
the owner. 7 2 The organization must file a status report at least
once a year disclosing all expenditures made in relation to the
property. 173
4.

Restoration of Possession by the Owner

At any time until five years after the entry of the order granting
temporary possession, the owner may petition the court for restoration of possession. The owner must pay the organization proper
compensation, as determined by the court, based upon the annual
status reports. 17 4 This compensation will include management fees
and will take into consideration income or receipts received by the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 854 (1987).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 67 1/2, para. 855 (1987).

Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 858 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 856 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 857 (1987).
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organization. 7 5 Possession of the property will be restored to the
owner subject to all existing leases.176
5. Judicial Deed
After five years, if the owner has not taken any action to regain
possession, the organization may file a petition for a judicial
deed. "77
' Upon due notice to the owner, the court may enter an
order granting a quitclaim deed to the organization. 78 This deed is
subject to the condition that the property be used for low- and middle-income housing for at least ten years after the deed is
granted. 7 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
several significant issues. The court demonstrated its willingness to
uphold very restrictive adult use zoning regulations. The court
narrowed the traditional property law right to exclude others when
the property in question is a portion of the bed of a private, nonnavigable lake. In this particular situation, the right to exclude
arises only when a neighboring lake bed owner's use of the lake
unduly interferes with the owner's use of the lake. The court clarified that a tax collector may offset a property tax refund against an
accrued tax liability on the same piece of property. Finally, in construing a 1903 deed, the court showed that it will look to a variety
of circumstances surrounding the drafting of a deed to determine
the grantor's intent.
In addition, the Illinois General Assembly passed two significant
acts during the Survey period. The first is, in effect, a consumer
protection measure. As a result of a series of scandals involving
residential mortgage brokers, the legislature has stepped in to
bridge a perceived regulatory gap. The second act provides nonprofit organizations with a method of returning abandoned buildings to the rental market for much needed low- and middle-income
housing.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, para. 859 (1987).

Id.
Id.

